AI and advanced automation are involved in almost all aspects of our life. In such systems, human responsibility for outcomes becomes equivocal. We analyze the descriptive abilities of a newly developed responsibility quantification model (ResQu) to predict actual human responsibility and perceptions of responsibility in HCI. In two laboratory experiments, participants performed an aided decision task. We compared the theoretical responsibility values to the actual responsibility a person took on and to the subjectively perceived responsibility. The ResQu model predictions were strongly correlated with the measured and the subjective responsibility. However, observed values differed from the model predictions, as less knowledgeable participants overestimated their own capabilities and assumed greater-than-optimal responsibility. The results demonstrate the value of the ResQu model as a descriptive model, considering some systematic deviations. It can be used to aid system design and guide policy and legal decisions regarding human responsibility in events involving intelligent systems.
INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced automation have become major parts of our life. They are prominent in finance (e.g., algorithmic trading), banking (e.g., automatic credit approvals), transportation (e.g., autonomous vehicles), medicine (e.g., advanced, data-based decision support), military settings (e.g., autonomous weapon systems), industry (e.g., automated production facilities), and other domains. In these systems, computers and humans share the collection and evaluation of information, decision-making and action implementation.
In intelligent systems or with high-level automation, human responsibility becomes equivocal. For instance, what is the human responsibility when all information about an event arrives through a system that collects and analyzes data from multiple sources, without the human having any independent information? If a human performs an action, the system indicated as necessary, is the human responsible for the outcome of the action, if it caused harm?
The humans' comparative responsibility depends on the intelligent system's configuration, reliability and performance, and the advanced system (or its developers) may share some of the responsibility [Johnson and Powers 2005, Coeckelbergh 2012 ]. The difficulty to determine the human's responsibility when using the rapidly developing intelligent systems and automation is expressed in the notion of a "responsibility gap" in the ability to divide responsibility between humans and the system [Matthias 2004 , Johnson 2014 . Until recently, there was no systematic way to quantify human responsibility when using intelligent systems and automation. XX:2 • N. Douer and J. Meyer To address this problem, we developed a theoretical Responsibility Quantification model (the ResQu model) of human responsibility in intelligent systems [Douer and Meyer 2018] . The ResQu model allows us to compute a theoretical responsibility measure, which is the expected share of the unique human contribution to the outcomes, given a specific system design, the function allocation between the human and the system, and the characteristics of the operational environment, the system and the human.
The ResQu model is normative, assuming perfect rationality on the part of the human, perfect knowledge about probabilities and properties of the system and optimal human utilization of the system. However, in reality, people may act non-optimally when they interact with intelligent systems and automation [Alvarado-Valencia and Barrero 2014 , Arnott 2006 , Baker et al. 2004 , Goddard et al. 2011 , Mosier et al. 1998 , Parasuraman and Riley 1997 . This raises the question whether our normative model can also serve as a descriptive model to describe actual human behavior. To address this question, we conducted two controlled experiments in which participants interacted with a simple decision support system in the controlled settings of a laboratory. Based on the observed behavior, we computed the measured responsibility, defined as the observed average share of the unique human contribution to the outcomes. We compared the scores to the corresponding theoretical ResQu values for the different experimental conditions.
Responsibility is also a psychological phenomenon. People may perceive their contribution to a process differently from their actual objective performance. Thus, it is also important to analyze the relation between subjective perceptions and both the theoretical and the measured responsibilities. To do so, we asked participants about their subjective evaluations of their contributions, and we computed an average score of subjective responsibility, which we compared to the corresponding theoretical and measured responsibility values. Fig. 1 summarizes the descriptions and properties of the three responsibility measures. The lab experiments involved a simple case of a binary alert system and a binary response by the human user. Binary alert and binary classification systems that warn the user about abnormal conditions or about the value of a variable exceeding some threshold, are the simplest form of intelligent systems. These systems are the most widely used decision aid in user interfaces and workstations, flight decks, industrial control rooms, vehicles, medical equipment, computer-aided diagnostic systems, smart homes, and many other computerized and AI systems [Bregman 2010 , Cicirelli et al. 2016 , Doi 2007 , Jalalian et al. 2013 , Meiring 2015 , Meyer 2001 , Meyer 2004 , Pritchett 2009 , Robles et al. 2010 , Vashitz et al. 2009 ]. The advantage of analyzing a binary decision support system is that in this case, the general responsibility model is reduced to relatively simple calculations and interpretations [Douer and Meyer 2019] .
The ResQu model for binary alerts
Let X denote the binary set of the action alternatives for the human user, and Y denote the binary classification set for the alert system. Then, the human responsibility can be defined as
where H(X) is Shannon's entropy, which is a measure of uncertainty related to a discrete random
and H(X/Y) is the conditional entropy, which is a measure of the remaining uncertainty about a variable X when a variable Y is known.
The ratio Resp(X) quantifies the expected exclusive share of the human in determining the action selection variable X,
given the alert indication Y. Resp(X) is closely related to Theil's uncertainty coefficient, which is a measure of association between the distributions of two variables [Theil, 1970 , Theil, 1972 . By definition, Resp(X) ∈ [0,1]. Resp(X)=1 if, and only if, the human action selection X is independent from the alert classification result Y, in which case the human is fully responsible for the system output. Resp(Z)=0 if, and only if, Y completely determines X, in which case the human actions are exclusively determined by the alert indications, so the human's comparative responsibility is zero.
The experimental task
Aided decision making is the combined performance of two detectors, the human and the alert system [Maltz & Meyer 2001 , Meyer 2001 , Meyer and Ballas 1997 , Sorkin 1988 , Sorkin and Woods 1985 . Both detectors obtain some information on the state of the environment, which is probabilistically related to the actual state of the environment. The two sources are imperfectly correlated, because otherwise they would be redundant. We used Signal Detection Theory (SDT) [Green and Swets 1966] to model the optimal human interaction when aided by a binary alert system. According to SDT, each detector has a certain detection sensitivity, d', which is usually defined as the distance between the means of the Signal and Noise distributions, measured in standard deviations. We will denote by d'A and d'H the detection sensitivities of the alert and the human. The larger the detection sensitivity, the easier it is for the detector to distinguish between signals and noise. The alert has a preset response criterion, which is used to determine its output by comparing the input value to a cutoff point. The binary output of the alert serves as additional input for the human. The human combines the information from the alert system with additional information the human has and responds accordingly.
Participants in our experiments saw an ambiguous stimulus (which will be referred to as the continuous information) and had to decide to which of two possible categories it belonged -"signal" or "noise". It is customary to refer to the rare event that needs to be detected (a cyberattack, a malfunction, a pathology, a crime, etc.) as the signal. The optimal response XX:4 • N. Douer and J. Meyer criterion that maximizes the expected value of the payoffs is β* = [(1-ps)/ps] [(VTN -VFP)/(VTP -VFN)], where pN=1-ps and pS are the probabilities for noise and signal, and VTN, VFP, VTP, and VFN are the values for True Negative (correctly responding "noise"), False Positive (falsely responding "signal"), True Positive (correctly responding "signal") and False
Negative (falsely responding "noise"), respectively.
When using a decision aid, the human should judge the values of the continuous variable with different response criteria, depending on the output of the decision aid (Robinson & Sorkin, 1985) . The different criteria are computed by replacing pS with pS|A (the conditional probability of a signal, given an alert) or pS|NA (the conditional probability of a signal,
given that there was no alert). When using a reliable alert system, the posterior probability for a signal is larger when an alert is issued, and is lower when no alert is issued, pS|A ≥ pS ≥ pS|NA. In this case, the user should adopt a lower cutoff point when an alert is issued (i.e., increase the tendency to declare a signal) and a higher cutoff point when no alert is issued (i.e., increase the tendency to declare a noise).
The human's differential adjustment of the cutoff points to the output of the alert system can serve as a measure for human trust in the alert system, and its weight in the decisions [Meyer and Lee 2013] . When the human uses a single cutoff point, regardless of indications from the alert system, he or she obviously ignores the alert and thus has full responsibility for the outcomes. The use of different cutoff points indicates that the human considers the information from the alert system when making a decision. The larger the difference between the cutoffs, the greater the weight the human gives to the information from the alert system.
Another measure for human trust in the alert system is the effective d', defined as the human's overall detection sensitivity d′, based on the combined detection capabilities of the alert system and the human. The optimal cutoff points and effective d' are computed, assuming the human is perfectly rational, has perfect knowledge about probabilities and properties of the alert and the environment, and aims to maximize the human's expected utility. However, in real-life conditions, people may become complacent and may rely too strongly on alerts. Alternatively, they may overestimate their own capabilities and may give insufficient weight to the alerts. Differences between the optimal values and the measured values of the cutoff differences and effective d' indicate automation biases, related to non-optimal user trust in the alert indications [Lee and Moray 1994 , Muir and Moray 1996 , Meyer and Lee 2013 , Meyer et al. 2014 .
We analyzed the SDT measures d' and β to investigate the causes for the deviations of the empirical responsibility from the optimal theoretical value, predicted by the ResQu model.
EXPERIMENT 1: THE EFFECT OF ′ ON HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
According to the ResQu model, the relative abilities of the human and the intelligent system are the main determinants of the human's responsibility. When the system's ability exceeds that of the human, the human's unique contribution diminishes, leading to low human responsibility. Conversely, when the human's ability exceeds that of the system, the human's responsibility will be high. Experiment 1 examined the ability of the ResQu model to predict actual human behavior and the perceptions of responsibility for different combinations of the human's and the alert's detection sensitivities.
We generated four experimental combinations by assigning the human and the alert system either low detection sensitivity (d' = 1) or high detection sensitivity (d' = 2.3). We computed the theoretical responsibility for each of the four combinations with the ResQu model [Douer and Meyer 2018] . Fig. 2 depicts the model predictions of human theoretical responsibility as a function of human's and the alert's detection sensitivities for the four selected experimental points. for the alert system and the human).
Method

Participants
Participants were 60 students from Tel Aviv University (ages 20-49, median 24, 62% females), of which 53 were undergraduate students and 48 belonged to the faculty of engineering. They were recruited through E-mail invitations and a post on a university webpage that serves to recruit students for experiments. We assigned the participants randomly to one of the four experimental subgroups, so that we had 15 participants in each subgroup. Each participant received 40
Israeli New Shekels [ILS] , about US $12, for taking part in the experiment. Conscientious performance of the task was encouraged by the promise of an additional monetary award (100 ILS, about US $29) to a randomly selected participant in each of the experimental groups, using the accumulated individual scores as weights for the selection.
Apparatus
The experiment was conducted on desktop computers, with Intel® i7 3.4 GHZ Processor, 8 GB RAM, NVIDIA® GeForce GT 610 Video Card, and 23-inch (56-cm) monitors. The experimental program was written in Python. Fig. 2 shows a schematic depiction of the experimental screen. It consisted of a 20 cm high and wide square at the center of the screen. Above the square were two fields, labeled "Total Score" and "Last Trial", which displayed the cumulative number of points and the number of points that were gained or lost in the last trial.
The experimental continuous stimulus was a rectangle, displayed for 30 seconds inside the large square. The rectangle had a fixed width, but its height varied. The height was sampled from one of two distributions of long and short rectangles.
In each trial, participants had to decide whether the rectangle was from the long or the short distribution. Similar to a method used in previous studies [Meyer 2001] , in each trial the rectangle appeared at a different position inside the large square to make it more difficult for participants to mark the cutoff point explicitly by, for instance, placing their finger on the screen.
The experimental binary stimulus from the alert system was a small square, located at the top of the screen, that could have one of two possible colors, either red (F44141 Hex color code), indicating an alert, or green (4EF442 Hex color code),
indicating that there was no alert. The binary alert stimulus appeared together with the rectangle stimulus, and it remained visible while the rectangle was shown.
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Participants responded by clicking with the mouse on either the "Accept" or the "Reject" button at the bottom of the screen, according to whether they thought that the rectangle belonged to the longer or the shorter distribution. After the response, the payoff for the trial appeared in the "Last Trial" field, and the "Score" field was updated. An additional feedback message, stating either "correct" or "incorrect", appeared for 2 seconds, and then the next trial began. Fig. 3 . A schematic depiction of the experimental screen. The figure presents an example in which there is an alert (the alert field is red), the cumulative number of points is 20, the participant chose a correct response in the last trial, which awarded an additional point.
Procedure and Design
The experiment was conducted in the "Interaction with Technology (IwiT) Lab" of the Industrial Engineering department at Tel Aviv University on groups of up to 7 participants. Each participant sat at a computer.
The instructions stated that the experiment is a simplified simulation of a quality control task in a factory. A certain percentage of the items the factory produces are defective. A quality control worker inspects and classifies each produced item and decides if it is "intact" and should be accepted, or a "defect" that should be rejected. The worker makes a decision, based on the vertical length of the rectangles. Intact items have a shorter mean length than defective items, but the two distributions overlap. Thus, when the worker observes a certain item length, uncertainty remains if it is intact or defective.
Participants were told that the factory considers acquiring an alert system that will aid the worker in the classification task.
The alert system classifies each item independently. The classification results appear as either a red indication, when the system identifies a potentially defective item, or a green indication, when the system identifies an item as intact. The factory considers two optional alert systems, which may differ in their classification accuracy. Participants were told that their mission is to rate and compare the performance and contribution of the two candidate systems.
Each participant performed 100 trials with each of the two alert systems, deciding on each trial whether or not to reject or to accept an item, based on the visual inspection of the item's length and the binary indication given by the alert system.
Participants received 1 point for any correct rejection of a defective item (True Positive) or acceptance of an intact item (True Negatives). Participants lost 1 point for rejecting an intact item (False Positive), and lost 2 points for accepting a defective item (False Negative). This payoff scheme reflects a factory's incentive not to deliver defective items to costumers, which is stronger than the incentive not to reject intact items.
The 100 trials with each alert system were divided into two blocks, each with 50 trials. The participants were told that the first block of 50 trials was mainly for learning and gaining basic experience with their own abilities and the abilities of the alert system, and that their performance will be assessed according to their score in the second block. In each block, for long distribution (defective items), representing a probability of .4 for a defective item. The trials were individually randomized for each participant, alert response and block.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups, differing in the distributions of the rectangle lengths, characterizing human detection sensitivity, which was either d'H=1 ("less-accurate" human) or d'H=2.3 ("accurate" human). All participants saw alerts from both the "less accurate" system that had a detection sensitivity of d′A=1.0 and from the "accurate" system that had a detection sensitivity of d′A=2.3, in two parts of the experiment. The order of the systems was counterbalanced, so that half of the participants saw alerts from the accurate system in the first part and from the lessaccurate system in the second part, and the other half of the participants saw the systems in reversed order.
Thus, there were four experimental subgroups in the experiment, created by combinations of two levels of the participant's detection sensitivity (d′H = 1 and d′H = 2.3) and the order in which the participants examined the two types of alert systems (d′A = 1 first or d′A = 2.3 first). Both alert systems used a response criterion of β=1, which matches the participants' payoffs matrix and a .4 probability for a defective item. Table 1 summarizes the outcome probabilities for the two systems and presents their positive and negative predictive values (PPV and NPV, respectively). These are the probabilities that an item was defective when the system indicated a defect (PPV) and that it was intact when the system indicated that it was intact (NPV). After completing the trials with each alert system, participants filled out a questionnaire, providing their subjective judgments on the accuracy of the alert system and its contribution to their performance. In each question, the participants rated their level of agreement on a scale between 1 (not at all) and 7 (very much). Table 2 presents the questions and the factors to which they relate. We analyzed the measured responsibility with a three-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with human detection sensitivity and the order in which the alert systems were examined as between-subjects variables and the type of alert system as a within-subjects variable. There was no significant main effect of the order of experiencing the two alert systems, nor any significant interaction that involved the order. Thus, we focus on the results for the remaining two variables and their interaction (see Table 3 for the results). As predicted by the ResQu model, the detection sensitivities of the alert and of the human affected the measured responsibility, which decreased in d'A, and increased in d'H. All participants relied more on information from the accurate alert system, leading to lower measured responsibility when using the less accurate alert system. In addition, the less accurate participants tended to rely more on the alert systems than accurate participants, so their measured responsibility was lower.
In most cases, the mean value of the measured responsibility was close to the theoretical prediction. Nonetheless, the less accurate participants deviated substantially from the optimal theoretical value when they saw the alerts from the accurate system (see Fig. 4 ).
Comparison to SDT measures of trust
The difference between the measured responsibility and the optimal theoretical value can either be due to participants failing to use the information they have independently, or they may give excessive or too little weight to the information from the alert. It is possible to distinguish between these two causes by analyzing the SDT measures of effective d' and the difference between cutoffs with and without the alert. Fig. 5 presents the optimal and mean empirical values for the effective d' and the cutoff differences. Table 4 summarizes the empirical deviations from theoretical predictions for both the ResQu model and SDT. In all combinations of human and alert detection sensitivity, the empirical effective d' was lower than the corresponding optimal theoretical value by 10%-15%. Thus, participants did not optimally combine the information from the two information sources. In particular, with the accurate alert system, less accurate participants reached an effective sensitivity (2.0) that was lower than the sensitivity of the alert system (2.3). They would have fared better if they would have entirely ignored the continuous stimulus and responded only to the indications from the alert system.
In most combinations of human and alert detection sensitivities, the cutoff difference was lower than the optimal value, implying that participants tended to under-trust the indications from the alert systems. The deviations from the optimal XX:10 • N. Douer and J. Meyer value were larger when participants saw the alerts of the accurate system, and was the largest for the less accurate participants with the accurate system. This deviation from the optimal values parallels that of the measured responsibility.
To conclude, the analysis of traditional SDT measures suggests that the deviation of the measured responsibility from the optimal theoretical value is mainly due to less accurate participants overestimating their own capabilities, compared to those of the accurate alert system. This led them to select non-optimal cutoff points and to combine information from multiple sources in non-optimal ways. This result is in line with previous results from behavioral research in SDT [Bartlett and McCarley 2017 , Maltz and Meyer 2001 , Meyer 2001 , Meyer et al, 2014 . It implies that users tend to overestimate their own capabilities, especially when they perform poorly. They assume greater-than-optimal responsibility by intervening more than needed, thereby impairing the overall system performance.
Subjective vs. measured responsibility
Questions Q3-Q5 referred to the participants' subjective assessments of their own responsibility. We reverse-scored questions Q3 and Q4 for the score to reflect responsibility, and we performed a reliability analysis to measure the consistency of the questions. The analysis showed high reliability, with Cronbach's α = .87, so we used their average as an estimate for the subjective responsibility.
The scores of subjective responsibilities were rated on a scale between 1 and 7, which is different from the objective scale of the measured responsibility. To compare the two results, we normalized the average scores of the two responsibilities. The normalized values of subjective responsibility were close to those of the measured responsibility (see Fig. 6 ). This implies that participants judged their marginal contribution with each alert system quite accurately. We analyzed the types of subjective assessments with three-way mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA), with human sensitivity and the order of the alert systems as between-subject variables, and the type of the alert system as a withinsubjects variable. The only significant effect involving the order of experiencing the two alert systems was the three-way interaction between order, human and alert sensitivity F(1,56)= 6.81, MSE=8.53, Par. η 2 = .12, p =.01, for the assessment of the alert's detection sensitivity. In all other cases, there was no significant main effect of the order, nor any significant interaction that involved the order. Thus, we focus on the results for the remaining two variables and their interactions. Question Q1 referred to the subjective assessment of the alert sensitivity. The only significant factor was the actual difference between the two alert system sensitivities. The accurate system was rated significantly higher (mean= 5.4, Sd= .14) than the less accurate system (mean= 3.9, Sd= .16). Thus, irrespective of their own sensitivity, all participants noticed that one system had a higher sensitivity.
In the analysis of question Q2, the subjective assessment of participants' own detection sensitivities, only the actual difference between the detection sensitivities of the two groups was significant. The more accurate participants rated their detection abilities significantly higher (mean= 5.3, Sd= .14) than the less accurate participants (mean= 4.5, Sd= .14).
Participants were clearly able to evaluate their own performance, independently from the performance of the alert systems.
The mean score for (reverse coded) questions Q3, Q4 and question Q5, reflected the participants' subjective assessments of their own responsibility. In this case, both the human and the alert sensitivities had significant effects, as had their interaction. The accurate participants rated their responsibility with the accurate system significantly lower (mean= 3.9, Sd= .21) than with the less accurate system (mean= 4.9, Sd= .23). The less accurate participants also rated their responsibility with the accurate system significantly lower (mean= 2.5 Sd= .21) than with the less accurate system (mean= 4.3, Sd= .23). The interaction between the participants and the alert types is due to the less accurate participants differentiating more between the two types of alert systems.
To conclude, as predicted by the ResQu model, the subjective assessment of responsibility depended on the combined assessment of the human's and the alert's detection sensitivities, and it was decreasing in d'A and increasing in d'H. In addition, the subjective assessment of responsibility was coherent with the subjective assessments made in Q1 and Q2, regarding the alert's and the human's sensitivities.
Subjective own-responsibility vs. another person's responsibility
Question Q6 referred to the subjective assessment of another person's responsibility. We compared this assessment to participants' assessment of their own responsibility, as expressed in questions Q3-Q5, by conducting a four-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with human detection and the order of the alert systems as between-subject variables and the type of alert system and the type of responsibility as within-subjects variables. There was no significant main effect of the order of experiencing the two alert systems, nor any significant interaction that involved the order. Thus, we focus on reporting the result regarding the remaining variables and their interactions. The human and the alert sensitivities and their interaction remained significant. Also, another person was seen as more responsible than oneself, and the difference was larger when the human sensitivity was lower, causing a significant interaction between the type of responsibility and human sensitivity (see Fig. 7 ).
Participants always rated their own responsibility as lower than that of another person in the same situation. This difference was particularly large when the human's ability was low. Even when other humans were known to have limited abilities, the participants considered them to be about as responsible as a person with greater abilities. This finding resembles the "fundamental attribution error" in social psychology [Andrews 2001 , Harman 1999 , Ross 2018 . 
Conclusions for Experiment 1
Experiment 1 showed that the ResQu model can serve as a descriptive model for both actual behavior (measured responsibility) and perceptions (subjective responsibility). Behavior differed from the model predictions when the less accurate participants saw alerts from the accurate system. These participants overestimated their own capabilities, which led them to select non-optimal cutoffs and to assume higher-than-optimal responsibility. In addition, participants systematically assigned higher subjective responsibility to the actions of another human then to themselves.
In Experiment 1, both the participants and the alert's design were based on the same evaluations of the payoff scheme and signal frequency, leading to the use of a similar response criterion (β). However, designers of alert systems may have perspectives and incentives that differ from those of the users, leading them to implement a different response criterion from the one the users adopt. Experiment 2 addresses the question how such differences affect the responsibility.
EXPERIMENT 2: THE EFFECT OF ON HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
The main determinants of human responsibility according to the ReQu model are the relative detection abilities of the alert system and the human. However, the responsibility also depends on the settings of the decision thresholds, used by the alert system and the human. Human responsibility is minimal, keeping everything else constant, when the system and the human use the same thresholds. This occurs when the preferences (i.e., the payoffs) and the expected probabilities of events are identical for the human and the system. When thresholds differ, the human usually has to take on more responsibility to compensate for the difference.
In Experiment 2, we examined the descriptive abilities of the ResQu model of actual human behavior and subjective perceptions for different combinations of the human's and the alert's response criterion (β). All participants in this experiment had poor detection sensitivity (d'H=1), inferior to that of the alert systems. Both alert systems had a high detection sensitivity of d′A=2.3, but they differed in their response criterion. One system had a response criterion of β=1, which matched the participant's optimal response criterion ("Matching β"), while the other used β=0.03, reflecting different incentives than those of the participants ("Different β"). With the above settings, the ResQu model [Douer and Meyer, 2018 ] predicted a theoretical responsibility value of 12% for the matching response criterion and 73% for the different response criterion.
Method
Participants
Participants were 30 students from Tel Aviv University (ages 20-34, median 25, 53% females), of which 28 were undergraduate students and 25 belonged to the faculty of engineering. The method of recruitment and the monetary reward for participation were the same as in Experiment 1.
Apparatus, Procedure and Design
The apparatus was identical to that of Experiment 1, and so were the prior information given to the participants, the participants' payoff scheme, the rate of defective items, the number of trials with each of the two alert systems, and the questionnaires. All participants encountered both alert systems. We counterbalanced the order of the systems, with 15 participants first seeing the alerts from the "matching β" system and then from the "different β" system, while the other 15 saw the alert systems in the reversed order. The alert system with a matching β had the same parameters as the accurate alert system in Experiment 1. The alert system with a different β reflected a much higher incentive to reduce the acceptance of defective units (False Negatives).
This came at the price of an increase in the rate of False Positives (false alarms). Due to the rate of defective items, whenever this alert system indicated an intact item, there was a 99% chance that it was indeed intact. On the other hand, the system's PPV was only 51%, so in just about half of the cases when the system indicated a defective item, it was indeed defective.
Results and Discussion
Theoretical vs. Measured Responsibility
The ResQu model predicts that when the alert's response criterion differs considerably from that of the human, the human will tend to assume greater responsibility, due to the differences between the incentives in selecting an action. Table   8 presents the empirical measured responsibility and the model predictions.
We analyzed the measured human responsibility with a two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the order in which the alert systems were examined as a between-subjects variable and the type of alert system as a within-subjects variable. As in Experiment 1, there were no significant effects of the order of experiencing the two alert systems. As predicted by the ResQu model, participants relied less on the information generated by the alert system with a different response criterion, leading to significantly higher measured responsibility with that system (mean= .85, Sd= .02), compared to the alert system with a matching response criterion (mean= .43, Sd= .04), F(1,28)= 110.43, MSE=2.7, Par. η 2 = .80, p < .0001.
When using the alert system with a different response criterion, the mean value of the measured responsibility was close to the theoretical prediction. However, participants deviated substantially from the optimal theoretical value when they saw the alert system with the matching response criterion (see table 8 ).
Comparison to SDT measures of trust
We investigated the deviations of the measured responsibility from the optimal theoretical value by analyzing the SDT measures effective d' and cutoff difference (see Table 8 for the optimal and mean empirical values). In both alert systems, the effective d' was lower than the corresponding maximal d'. In addition, in both alert systems, the cutoff difference was lower than the corresponding optimal theoretical value, implying that participants tended to under-trust the two alert systems. Thus, participants did not optimally combine the information from the two sources. At first, there seems to be an inconsistency between the deviations of the measured responsibility and the cutoff difference from their optimal values. The measured responsibility deviated more for the alert system with the matching response criterion, while the cutoff difference deviated more for the alert system with a different response criterion. The inconsistency may be explained by refining the measure of trust, using its two sub components, reliance and compliance.
According to [Meyer 2001] compliance refers to the level of trust in the alert system when the system issues an alert (i.e., a red indicator). Reliance refers to the level of human trust in the alert system when it indicates that all is well (i.e., a green indicator). These levels of reliance and compliance are reflected, respectively, by the distance of the cutoff point from zero, when the alert indicator is red or green. Table 9 performs such a breakdown of trust for the settings in our experiment. For the alert system with a different response criterion, the optimal theoretical cutoff setting is asymmetrical (4.6 and .6 respectively), due to a large difference between its NPV and PPV values (see Table 7 ). With this system, participants only deviated considerably from the optimal value when the alert indicator was green (Difference = 4) but used an almost optimal value when it was red (Difference = -.3). Thus, the difference between the theoretical predictions and the empirical behavior is mainly related to participants' under-reliance. It is important to note that in 80% of the trials participants saw a red indication and therefore behaved close to the theoretical prediction. Thus, the standard SDT measure of cutoff difference might be misleading with this system, because it does not take into account the relative probabilities of the occurrence of events. A better measure would be the average absolute deviation of empiric values from the optimal values (1.04) which is much lower than the seemingly large deviation from optimality in the cutoff differences (4.3).
For the alert system with a matching response criterion, there were similar average levels of under-reliance and undercompliance, so in all cases participants deviated quite substantially from the optimal theoretical value (by .95). Conversely, XX:16 • N. Douer and J. Meyer as presented above, for the alert system with the different response criterion, in 80% of the cases the participants complied with the alert and deviated only slightly from the optimal theoretical value (by .3). This explains why the measured deviation from the optimal responsibility values was larger for the alert system with a matching response criterion (31%) than for the alert system with a different response criterion (12%).
To conclude, the ResQu model's responsibility measure takes into account the different base probabilities for signals, alert indications, and the human responses, given the signals and indications. The deviation of the measured responsibility from the optimal values can be better understood from analyzing compliance and reliance separately, rather than using more traditional SDT measures of trust.
Subjective vs. measured responsibility
Questions Q3-Q5 referred to the participants' subjective assessments of their own responsibility. We reverse-scored questions Q3 and Q4 for the score to reflect responsibility. A reliability analysis, using Cronbach's α showed α = .82.
Hence we used the mean of the three questions as a measure for the subjective responsibility.
As in Experiment 1, the normalized average values of subjective responsibility were close to those of the measured responsibility. For the system with the matching response criterion, the average normalized subjective responsibility was -1.8 and the normalized measured responsibility was -1.6. For the system with the different response criterion, the normalized subjective responsibility was 0.4 and the normalized measured responsibility was 1.1. This implies that here, too, participants judged their level of marginal contribution with each alert system quite accurately.
We analyzed the different types of subjective assessments with a two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the type of alert system as a within-subject variable and the order in which the alert systems were examined as a betweensubject variable. There was no significant effect of the order of experiencing the two alert systems, so we focus on reporting the result regarding the effects of the alert response criteria.
Question Q1 referred to the subjective assessment of the alert system's detection ability. The ability of the system with a matching response criterion was rated significantly higher (mean= 5.9, Sd= .13) than the system with a different response criterion (mean= 3.6, Sd= .24), F(1,28)= 57.29, MSE=77.07, Par. η 2 = .67, p < .0001.
Question Q2 referred to subjective assessment of the participant's own detection sensitivity. The participants rightly perceived their own detection ability as the same with both alert systems (Mean= 4.2, Sd= .21 and Mean= 4.1, Sd= .23 for the alert system with the different and the matching response criteria, respectively), F(1,28)= .14, MSE=.15, Par. η 2 = .01, p =.71.
The mean score for (reverse coded) questions Q3, Q4 and question Q5, reflected subjective assessment of human responsibility. As predicted by the ResQu model, the participants assessed that they had less responsibility with the system with the matching response criterion (mean= 2.3, Sd= .16) and significantly more responsibility with the system with the different response criterion (mean= 4.2, Sd= .22), F(1,28)= 53.4, MSE=54.78, Par. η 2 = .66, p < .0001. This result is consistent with the subjective assessments expressed in Q1 and Q2 regarding the alert's and the human's performance
Subjective own responsibility vs. another human's responsibility
Question Q6 referred to the subjective assessment of another person's responsibility. We compared this assessment to participants' assessment of their own responsibility with each alert system, as expressed in questions Q3, Q4 and Q5, by conducting a three-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the order of the alert systems as a between-subject variable and the type of alert system and type of responsibility as within-subjects variables. There was no significant main effect of the order of experiencing the two alert systems, nor any significant interaction that involved the order condition.
Thus, we focus on reporting the result regarding the remaining variables and their interactions (see Table 10 for the results). Participants always rated their own responsibility as lower than that of another person in the same situation. The difference was particularly large for the system with a matching response criterion (see Fig. 8 ). 
Conclusions for Experiment 2
Experiment 2 showed that the ResQu model can describe how differences between the human and the alert response criteria affect measured and perceived responsibility. As predicted by the model, participants trusted the alert system with a matching response criterion more, leading to lower measured and subjective responsibility with it. As in the parallel condition in Experiment 1, participants assumed greater-than-optimal responsibility when seeing indications from the system with the matching cutoff. The subjective assessments were again biased, systematically attributing greater responsibility to the other person.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this study was to analyze the value of the newly developed normative ResQu model of human responsibility for predicting the actual responsibility users take on and their subjective perceptions of responsibility. The results of the two experiments demonstrate that the ResQu model is not only a theoretical model for quantifying human responsibility in interactions with intelligent systems and advanced automation, but it is also a descriptive model that allows us to predict human's measured and subjective responsibility. This means that one can consider the characteristics of the human, the XX:18 • N. Douer and J. Meyer system and the environment, and one can compute a ResQu value that can serve to assess the actual human responsibility or how humans will perceive their own responsibility.
The results also show that the ResQu model's measure of responsibility, which is based on entropy, has some advantages over other measures that are used to analyze human trust in intelligent systems. The responsibility measure considers the different base probabilities for the signal, the alert indications, and the resulting human responses, and reflects the share of unique human contribution to the outcomes, in one, easily interpretable number. Thus, it can serve as a new quantification of user trust.
The ResQu model generally provided quite accurate predictions, but a systematic bias existed when the capabilities of the system clearly exceeded those of the human. Participants overestimated their own capabilities and assumed greaterthan-optimal responsibility. Thus, when the ResQu model assigns low theoretical responsibility to the user, system designers need to take into account that users may intervene excessively, impairing the overall system performance. In these cases, a choice will have to be made whether to progress to fully autonomous systems with very little human involvement, or whether to maintain a certain level of human involvement at the price of lowering system performance Our result showed that people's perception of their comparative contribution was accurate. This implies that users of systems with capabilities that exceed those of the user may feel (correctly) that they have no significant impact on the system. This may lower users' motivation and wellbeing [Hassenzahl and Klapperich 2014 , Rangarajan, et al. 2005 , Smith et al. 1999 ]. In addition, theses users might attempt to create more meaningful involvement, for instance, by adopting individual decision criteria that differ from those the automation uses. This creates situations that resemble those we studied in Experiment 2, and may lead to a negative effect on the outcomes the system tries to achieve. The ResQu model enables system designers to identify such cases in advance and take them into consideration when planning the human role in the system (e.g. by assigning the human additional meaningful duties).
Another bias we found in our results was a systematic tendency to attribute more responsibility to another person than to oneself in the same situation. This resembles aspects of the "fundamental attribution error". It implies that an outside observer, such as a manager, might attribute more responsibility to a person who uses an intelligent systems or advanced automation than the person actually has. This, in turn, may lead to unjustifiably holding humans responsible for adverse outcomes in situations in which they rightly trusted the system. The ResQu model may be used to quantify and present the actual marginal level of human contributions. It can thereby help to calibrate such exogenous responsibility attributions.
Our study has far-reaching implication. The three measures of responsibility we compute (the theoretical, measured and perceived responsibility), which regards the expected share of unique human contribution to the outcomes, can be compared to the role responsibility which assigns specific duties to the operator of automation, by organizational definitions. In many cases, this role responsibility is used to identify who will be held accountable for adverse outcomes. However, when people use intelligent systems and advanced automation with capabilities that exceed those of the human, it is almost inevitable that the unique human contribution (i.e. the ResQu responsibility) will be small, even if formally the human is assigned major roles. Simply putting a human into the loop does not assure that the human will have a meaningful role in the process. This is the case, for example, with advanced weapon systems, in which the issue of "meaningful human control" has become a key topic in discussions [Crootof 2016 , Heyns 2016 , Horowitz and Scharre 2015 , Neslage 2015 , UNIDIR 2014 .
The demand to involve humans in automated processes also exists in other domains. System designers often keep humans in the loop to supervise the automation and to handle unexpected events, even when the human may have limited abilities to do so. A prominent example are provisions regarding automated decision making in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which says in Article 22(1): "The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her." The interpretation of this article states that it constitutes a general prohibition for decision making based solely on automated processing. This means that to conform to the GDPR requirements, institutions will have to involve humans in automated decision processes. Realistically speaking, these humans will, of course, base their decisions largely on information from decision support systems. Thus, despite the seeming adherence to the requirement not to fully automate the decision process, the actual comparative human responsibility, according to the ResQu model, will likely be minimal. Here again, organization should consider what is the true added value of the human to system processes, beyond the simple role of approving system decisions and what does it actually mean to have meaningful human control.
We do not advocate or criticize a certain way to involve humans in a process. Rather, our model describes human involvement in processes and quantifies the comparative responsibility the human has for outcomes, given the properties of the situation. This analysis should be part of the evaluation of different system design alternatives. A specific design may give humans a more central role in a process, but this may come at the prize of limiting the use of the capabilities the automation may have to offer. Similarly, introducing better automation into an existing system will almost necessarily lower the human responsibility and involvement. One needs to be aware of these changes and be prepared to deal with the implications they may have on the functioning of the system and on the humans' attitudes towards the system and their role in it. Thus, the ResQu model provides a new quantitative method that may aid system design and guide policy and legal decisions regarding human responsibility in events involving AI, decision support systems and advanced automation.
